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There Are No Schools in Utopia: John
Dewey’s Democratic Education
Ian T. E. Deweese-Boyd
A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a
better country, sets sail. Progress is the realization of Utopias.
(Oscar Wilde 2001, 141)
“The most utopian thing in Utopia is that there are no schools,” writes John Dewey
(1933/1989, 136). With these words, Dewey opened his talk to kindergarten teachers on April 21, 1933 at Teachers College, Columbia University. Published a couple
days later in the New York Times under the title, “Dewey Outlines Utopian Schools,”
we find Dewey in this little-discussed talk fancifully imagining himself among the
Utopians—somehow transported from the economically depressed United States
of the 1930s to Utopia, where the economy of acquisition is nothing but a memory.1
Finding himself in Utopia, Dewey, of course, asks about the schools, quizzing the
Utopians on everything from their pedagogy to their educational goals. What he
discovers is a radical critique of education as it was (and still is) often practiced.
The emphasis on standards and the competitive and punitive systems of examinations that enforce them appear deeply misguided to the Utopians. They contend
that it is our economic system and its emphasis on “personal acquisition and private
possession” that has reduced education to the mere acquisition of facts, necessary
for the further acquisition of things. According to the Utopians, once their acquisitive economy had passed away, education itself was transformed, liberated in a way
that enabled teachers to concentrate their attention on identifying and developing
the unique capacities of each student. Instead of a single-minded focus on delivering the
facts of the curriculum, the Utopians were able to see the child as the gravitational center
of the educational enterprise.
The contemporary conversation about education in America, and in many
other western educational contexts, could not be further from this vision. American society is more driven by acquisition than ever, and its children are exposed to
an unprecedented onslaught of advertising aimed at training them in the practice of
consumption.2 In school, the same children are scrutinized by high-stakes, standardized examinations that stand as the goal and measure of learning. Education itself—in
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the context of a consumption-oriented society— becomes a commodity among commodities. This situation, I argue, gives us good reason to consider Dewey’s Utopians
and his own democratic prescription for educational and societal transformation.
After offering an overview of the Utopian’s educational vision, along with
their understanding of the obstacles keeping schools from realizing this vision, I
will examine the objection that the Utopians (and Dewey) naïvely reject the reality
of economic motivation in learning. A consideration of Dewey’s own understanding
of curriculum, vocation, and democracy—which underwrites the Utopian’s vision
and critique—shows this objection to be largely misplaced. Far from overlooking the
influence that economic motivation plays in education, Dewey sees that this motivation itself can be a threat to the attitudes necessary for truly democratic ways of living.

Dewey’s Outline for Utopian Schools: The Vision
As Dewey’s first line suggests, there are no schools of the traditional sort in Utopia. With
orchards, gardens, greenhouses, wilderness, workshops, kitchens, and chemistry labs,
children are given ample space to encounter the realities of the world and to discover and
pursue their particular interests. The classrooms themselves are open, flexible spaces that
facilitate face-to-face interaction. Combined with a limit on size—less than two hundred
pupils—these schools support the “close, intimate personal acquaintance” necessary for
genuine engagement (Dewey 1933/1989, 135). Education itself is a sort of apprenticeship
in which children work with adults and older peers, gradually taking on responsibilities
commensurate with their developing capacities. Engaged in real occupations, working
alongside masters—who “combine special knowledge of the children” with expertise in
a certain area (Dewey 1933/1989, 137)—they encounter the content of what we call the
curriculum in a context that gives it both meaning and point.3
At the center of Dewey’s utopian vision, or as he puts it, at the center of the
Utopian’s vision of education, is the identification and cultivation of each child’s
unique capacities. When he asks the Utopians about the objectives of their educational activities, he gets blank stares—they don’t understand the question; they
don’t conceive of education as having measurable objectives like the meeting of
standards. But, based on his observations, he reckons:
The fundamental purposes were thoroughly ingrained in the working of
the activities themselves. In our language, [the objective] might be said to
be the discovery of the aptitudes, the tastes, the abilities and the weaknesses
of each boy and girl, and then to develop their positive capacities into attitudes and to arrange and reinforce the positive powers so as not to cover
up the weak points but to offset them. (Dewey 1933/1989, 138)

Accordingly, Utopian educators seek “to find out what each individual person [has]
in him from the beginning, and then devote themselves to finding out the conditions of the environment and the kinds of activities in which the positive capaci-
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ties of each young person could operate most effectually” (139). Given an environment in which to pursue their intrinsic interests and to exercise their growing
capacities, Dewey’s Utopians argue, the process of learning is itself immediately
enjoyable, not something simply to get through for the sake of some future joy. The
attitude that sustains such learning is what Dewey calls a “positive sense of power,”
a kind of confidence and pleasure in the exercise and growth of one’s capacities.
This attitude, shaped and sustained by the educators and the school alike, involves
the “elimination of fear, of embarrassment, of constraint, of self-consciousness;
eliminat[ion, in short, of] the conditions which create . . . the feeling of failure and
incapacity” (140). Equipped with the fortitude this sort of education grants them,
these students emerge from their education ready and willing to do work that both
matches their capacity and serves society; they will also be eager to discover and
solve the problems that inevitably arise along the way. Accordingly, these students
will be happy and capable in their work, and though he doesn’t mention it explicitly, Dewey implies that they will have developed the ability to identify the social
conditions necessary to sustain their good work as well as that of their neighbors.
According to Dewey’s Utopians, our schools (for now let’s assume a family resemblance) fall short of this ideal, because our acquisitive economic system has so infiltrated our consciousness that we find it difficult to see learning as anything but the
acquisition and storing away of facts. The relentless drive to possess or consume extends
to education by reducing knowledge to another commodity. Emphasis on getting this
commodity, according to the Utopians, has the effect of displacing the work of “creating attitudes by shaping desires and developing needs that are significant in the process
of living”—the central task of education in their view (1933/1989, 139). It isn’t simply
that the schools don’t actively cultivate such attitudes, but that their goals and methods
themselves create conditions that may well stifle them. For example, to ensure the acquisition of the standards, schools employ “competitive methods of appeal to rivalry,
the use of rewards and punishments, of set examinations and systems of promotion”
(139). These competitive methods, the Utopians imply, ensure self-consciousness, fear
of failure, and incapacity for many if not most students. Extrinsic rewards and punishments undermine intrinsic motivation, transforming the curriculum into an unpleasant
means, valuable only for what it can help one get. “So it was,” according to the Utopians,
“that we had come to regard all study as simply a method of acquiring something, even
if only useless or remote facts, and thought of learning and scholarship as the private
possession of the resulting acquisition” (139). Alienated from learning in school, these
children will be alienated from work as adults, forever acquiring and yet never gaining
the prize. The motto of these schools, according to the Utopians, is that “man never is,
but always is to be, blest” (139). This education, conditioned as it is by the acquisitive
economic society, serves to perpetuate a society that measures achievement and success
in purely economic terms, that inevitably has economic winners and losers, and that
forces many to choose economic survival over vocational fulfillment.
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In contrast to the Utopian society, where this economic model has been
abolished, those who emerge from this education are not likely to know what their
particular capacities are or what they enjoy doing. Instead, insofar as they are interested in their abilities, they value them for the economic benefits they may afford them. In this way, they end up objectifying not only the curriculum, but also
their own capacities. Their value, even to themselves, is largely economic in nature.

Utopianism in Education: An Objection to Dewey’s Vision
With the Utopians’ vision and critique in view, we can now consider whether
this vision is realistic. In his own day, Dewey was accused of being utopian in his
views about education and democracy—no doubt that is part of the joke behind
his talk—and the Utopians turn out to be advocates of Dewey’s philosophy of education. While Dewey’s stock has certainly risen since then, skepticism toward his
educational vision is still relatively easy to find. For example, Alexander Sidorkin
(2009) argues that Dewey’s vision is hopelessly utopian, precisely because it systematically ignores the role economic interest must play in motivating learning.4
Dewey, in short, is utopian—read naïve—in his belief that learning can and should
be motivated primarily by intrinsic interests rather than extrinsic economic ones.5
Sidorkin’s view that economic interests must be used to motivate learning, since
such interests motivate all work, is itself emblematic of the perspective Dewey saw
as so corrosive to any education that would lead to social progress and reform. Consequently, examining Sidorkin’s objection helps to clarify why Dewey thought the
acquisitive economy represented such a danger both to education and to democracy.
In particular, it will help us to see how Dewey’s understanding of the curriculum
and of vocation underwrite his and the Utopians’ emphasis on developing intrinsic
interests over and above extrinsic economic ones.
Sidorkin (2009) takes the principle attribute of utopias to be that they “ignore people’s material interests and the limits inherent in any social institution”
(191). He clarifies his notion of educational utopianism further this way: “Children’s wishes and interests are important to Dewey, but their economic reasoning
is simply invisible to him. Dewey assumes that we can expect children to perform
any amount of work in school, if we only select and organize such work properly.
This thinking leads to the utopian concept of education that simply does not take
into account the limits of what schooling can and cannot deliver, and how much
we can ask children to do” (191).
Sidorkin goes on to argue that we should recognize that “the sum total of
children’s activities, including play and useful occupations, cannot generate the
interest sufficient to ensure students’ motivation to learn the school curriculum,
however it is reformed or redefined” (2009, 195). At base, Sidorkin rejects Dewey
and his Utopians view that the intrinsic interest of the child should be what connects the child to the curriculum and ultimately to his or her work as unrealistically
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discounting the power of economic interest. In a sense, Sidorkin is right that Dewey
seeks to minimize the role of economic interest in the classroom, but he fails to see
why precisely Dewey does this, assuming it is simply naïveté.6

The Economy and the Curriculum
Sidorkin’s critique rests upon the idea that the curriculum is a sort of commodity to
be acquired by the student, and teaching a kind of economic transaction. As he construes it, education is a kind of trade in which students agree to learn “boring stuff”
not intrinsically interesting or particularly good for them in exchange for something
they find valuable.7 He is skeptical of Dewey’s belief that there is “a way to hitch the
school curriculum to the authentic interests of the child” (193), because he thinks
the child’s interests only go so far; an interest in gardening does typically not imply
one in soil chemistry.8 The solution to instruction, in his view, consists in providing
the right economic incentives for doing the work of learning. “To make children
work in schools,” he suggests, “we can force them or we can pay them; there isn’t
really a third way” (193). This is why Sidorkin argues that we need “to pay students
and their families for demonstrating learning that we deem important (198). This
startling conclusion might make sense if one took the curriculum to be a commodity (having value only as a means to economic gain) and instruction an economic
transaction, but Dewey assumes neither and consequently insists on a third way.9
To understand why Dewey thinks children not only can, but must, develop
intrinsic interests intense enough to carry them deep into the curriculum, it is necessary to consider his own view of the curriculum. In The Child and the Curriculum
(1902), Dewey addresses the problem of instruction; namely, how do we bring the
content of the curriculum—the organized, formulated, crystallized body of all that
we have learned about living in the world—into the living world of the child in the
classroom? The curriculum, he argues, can’t be separated from the experiences that
created it without making it inert and meaningless to the child in the classroom.
It will appear to be “boring stuff,” and uninteresting to the degree that it retains
its abstract shape. When curricular subject matter lacks “any organic connection
with what the child has already seen, felt, and loved,” it will seem “purely formal
and symbolic” to the child (1902, 31). For Dewey, the child and the curriculum represent limits of a single process, instruction being the means by which the child is
brought deeper into the knowledge the curriculum represents. The instructor’s task
is to provide concrete activities that connect the curriculum to the living child. He
calls this “psychologizing” the curriculum, and contends that “if the subject matter . . . grows out of [the child’s] own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and
grows into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or
trick of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist “interest.” The psychologized
is of interest—that is, it is placed in the whole of conscious life so that it shares the
worth of that life” (1902, 35). Accordingly, such activities are not simply pedagogical
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sugar-coating—they are the living curriculum. This is why he rejects, as artificial,
means that make the subject matter interesting for reasons having no direct connection to that subject matter, like the economic incentives Sidorkin suggests. To
introduce such means would inhibit the connection necessary for the curriculum
to come alive in the child.
In Dewey’s view, the chief task of education is to connect the relevant parts
of the curriculum to the life of the child by engaging her present interests in concrete tasks.10 Accordingly, the point of bringing something like gardening into the
school is to bring the abstract facts of the curriculum into the concrete experience
of the child. As Dewey explains:
Gardening . . . need not be taught either for the sake of preparing future
gardeners, or as an agreeable way of passing time. It affords an avenue of
approach to knowledge of the place farming and horticulture have had in
the history of the race and which they occupy in the present social organization. Carried on in an environment educationally controlled, they are
means for making a study of the facts of growth, the chemistry of soil, the
role of light, air, and moisture, injurious and helpful animal life, etc. There
is nothing in the elementary study of botany which cannot be introduced
in a vital way in connection with caring for the growth of seeds. Instead
of the subject matter belonging to a particular study called botany, it will
then belong to life, and will find, moreover, its natural correlations with the
facts of soil, animal life, and human relations. (1916, 200, emphasis mine)

For Dewey, the mind doesn’t stand aloof from activity; rather, it is unavoidably immersed in the processes of the world. The curriculum is an idea—it is an abstraction of actual experience, like a map; the map represents actual wanderings, real
expeditions (Dewey, 1902).11 For Dewey, these abstractions are literally meaningless if they are not embedded in their relation to human activity. Occupations like
gardening, then, engage students in processes that embody the subject matter of
the curriculum and arouse their interests, making them agents in the process, not
mere spectators. The difference between the spectator and agent is in the sort of
interest taken in an activity; the spectator, having no stake and no means to shape
the outcome, is indifferent; the agent, having a deep concern over the foreseen ends,
is eager to determine the best way to reach them. An occupation like gardening
gives students the opportunity to be agents. Depending on age, this interest will
take different forms. A five-year-old may simply want to see the wheat sprout and
grow green, while an older child might want to see whether she can get her plants
to produce more tomatoes this year than last. As Dewey suggests, over the course
of years students “will perceive problems of interest which may be pursued for the
sake of discovery, independent of the original direct interest in gardening” (200).
To the question, “How, upon this basis, shall the child get the needed information;
how shall he undergo the required discipline?” (1902, 59), Dewey, like the Uto-
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pians, responds that this is really the wrong sort of question. It assumes that the
curriculum is simply information to be acquired and that discipline is something
valuable in its own right. Instead, the curriculum is of use in the context of activities undertaken, and discipline is necessary only in the context of reaching desired
ends. Like a map, it is useful only to those who want to go somewhere.12
Only children genuinely interested in something will develop the ability to
inquire, to identify and solve problems, or, to return to the map metaphor, to chart
new territories, by adding to the store of knowledge represented by the curriculum.
Accordingly, the linchpin to Dewey’s educational vision is the development of the
attitudes that make the child, and later the adult, keen to understand and energetic
for the search. Intrinsic interest, then, isn’t simply a means for acquiring curricular
content—it’s an end in its own right.
Sidorkin’s critique of Dewey’s use of occupations relies upon the mistaken
view that they serve simply as means for delivering the content of the curriculum
and that interest is only a pedagogical tool. Dewey’s concern to develop the capacity for intrinsic interest, however, goes much deeper than this. Ultimately, the
ability to find deep interest in occupations—interest that embraces not only their
curricular content, but also their social value—prepares the child to find meaning, pleasure, and social significance in her work as an adult, as Dewey’s account
of vocation makes clear.13

Vocation, Democracy, and Utopia
For Dewey, a vocation is meaningful activity that matches one’s aptitude and
interest to needs of the community of which one is a member. Thus, he writes in
Democracy and Education, “To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an
opportunity to do it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than failure to
discover one’s true happiness in life, or to find that one has drifted or been forced
by circumstance into an uncongenial calling” (1916, 308). Ideally, then, schools assist students in the discovery of “what they are good for,” helping them to identify
and develop their capacities in a way that serves social needs and provides personal
meaning (307–09). As we have seen, the schools of Utopia focus almost exclusively
on this task. For them, the curriculum’s utility is found first in the discovery of
the child’s specific potential, and second, in identifying the path best suited for
developing it. The faith of both Dewey and his Utopians is that students afforded
the opportunity to develop their potential in ways directly interesting to them will
not only be personally happy, but also socially useful. Dewey and his Utopians see
the acquisitive society as a threat to this task because it introduces pressures that
alienate people from their true callings.
When identifying the greatest evil of the present state of society, Dewey (1916)
points to “the fact that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to
them, which are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues” (317). Such
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people lack economic freedom in the sense that “their pursuits are fixed by accident
and necessity of circumstances,” and, as a consequence, these pursuits “are not the
normal expression of their own powers interacting with the needs and resources
of the environment” (136). The implication is that work might spring from the
normal expression of a person’s capacities in the context of purposes that engage
her interests. Such work, while no doubt having economic value, would neither be
determined by nor pursued primarily for the sake of its economic value; such work
would be a “vocation” in Dewey’s sense. When economic factors force one into
work that does not connect to personal interest, neither the heart nor the mind is
deeply engaged.14 In view of these things, it is clear why fostering a sense of intrinsic interest is essential for schoolwork, and why Dewey explicitly rejects appeals to
economic rewards of the sort Sidorkin (2009) recommends.
Schools provide a place in which occupations may, freed from the distorting
effects of the economy, be pursued for their own sakes. Pursued in this way, they
have enormous pedagogical value, since they bridge the great gap between the life
of the child and the content of the curriculum. But their value extends beyond
such academic concerns, since what is cultivated in the process of such an education is the capacity to find and pursue one’s interests with devotion and discipline.
In Dewey’s view, helping students find their vocation involves not only the
identification and development of their abilities, but also the fostering of their appreciation of the ways their abilities connect to the needs of society. Part of what
students gain from pursuing occupations in school—where they have been “freed
from . . . the pressures of wage-earning” (1916, 200)—is the ability to grasp their
social value or, as Dewey puts it, their connection to “fundamental common concerns” (1916, 199).15 Engaging in occupations, then, raises awareness of social interdependence. “An occupation,” in its most genuine sense, “balances the distinctive
capacity of an individual with his social service” (1916, 308). In Dewey’s view, to the
degree that people are able to engage in occupations of this sort, their work “makes
the lives of others better worth living, and . . . makes the ties which bind persons
together more perceptible [thereby breaking] down the barriers of distance between
them” (1916, 316). Insofar as democracy itself is a mode of communicated experience measured by the number and quality of connections and shared interests, a
society in which people have found their vocations would be thoroughly democratic
in Dewey’s sense. In such a society, people would find intrinsic interest in their
work uncoerced by extrinsic economic factors. In short, such a society would be
very similar to the Utopia that stands on the other side of the acquisitive economy.
Though Dewey sees that such a society may seem a distant dream, nothing ultimately stands in the way of its realization if the appropriate educational
reforms are adopted, if basic dispositions of the next generation are altered. Such
an alteration in attitude, he thinks, can only be accomplished by transforming the
society of the school itself: “We may produce in schools a projection in type of the
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society we should like to realize, and by forming minds into accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society” (1916, 317).
Accordingly, the path to Utopia is thoroughly educational in nature, and, paradoxically, utopian education turns out to be the means by which this transformation is
accomplished, not simply its result.
Both the vision for such social transformation and the faith in the educational
means he advocates stem from Dewey’s faith in the ideal of radical democracy, an
ideal that Richard Bernstein (2010) insists functions as “an end-in-view that can
guide our actions here and now. It is an ideal that serves as a critical standard for
evaluating the deficiencies of ‘really existing’ democracies and serves also as a guide
for concrete action” (295). It functions, then, like Oscar Wilde’s map, like the curriculum itself, locating us and equipping us for the never-ending “utopian task of
shaping the future” (McKenna 2001, 101).16
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way Dewey’s notion of work and vocation aims at cultivating just this sort of interest. For more on
Dewey’s view of interest, see Mark E. Jonas, “Dewey’s Conception of Interest and Its Significance
for Teaching Education,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 43, no. 2 (2011): 112–29.
10. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916). As Dewey
says, “The problem of instruction is . . . that of finding material which will engage a person
in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment or interest to him and dealing with
things . . . as the condition for the attainment of ends” (1916, 132).
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concerns arise from schools as we know them; the Utopian schools allow for children to mix
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is clearly right that making everyone in the class garden may not arouse the sort of interest
Dewey is talking about, but that is the fault of the structure of the school, not the notion of
interest. This is Dewey’s point in saying that there are no schools in Utopia.
13. Jonas, “Dewey’s Conception of Interest,” 2011. Jonas’s excellent analysis of “interest” in
Dewey helps to highlight this point. For Dewey, interest is a matter of identity and self-expression.
Jonas writes, “Dewey believes that students become interested in a particular object . . . when they
regard that object as so important that if they cannot apprehend it—absorb it, so to speak, through
physical or psychical interaction—they will not be able to be the individuals they desire to be” (115).
Interest, in this sense, clearly carries with it both motivation and meaning.
14. Dewey argues that this interest isn’t merely individual, but also social. An interest in
gardening, for instance, arises from and answers to a larger social need, namely, the feeding
of the hungry. It’s this value that strikes deep interest, and, paradoxically, it’s this value that
is often obscured by the pressures of purely economic interest. As Dewey (1916) points out,
“If the mass of mankind has usually found in its industrial occupations nothing but evils
which had to be endured for the sake of maintaining existence, the fault is not in the occupations, but in the conditions under which they are carried on” (200). The economy itself
seems to play a significant role in creating these conditions, reducing work to a mere means
for gaining money and maintaining existence.
15. Stemhagen and Pope (2012) make a similar point regarding the value of occupationcentered or vocational schooling in Dewey’s philosophy of education (cf. 307–10).
16. I want to thank the two anonymous reviewers for exceptionally helpful feedback on this
essay, which helped me to connect it to the larger discussion of utopian thinking and Dewey’s work.
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